

The Role of Women in Learning Games and Water Management Outcomes

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Economic games have emerged as promising tools for fostering sustainable resource management, yet their gender dynamics remain underexplored. We examine how women's participation relates to the effectiveness of game-based learning in 56 Indian communities facing water management challenges. These structured experiential learning environments allow participants to develop system understanding, problem-solving capacities, and collective action through active engagement. Our results suggest that greater female involvement is associated with improved water management outcomes two years after the intervention. Notably, the presence of female leaders correlated with broader participation among women, which in turn was linked to the development of more effective management rules. These findings indicate that gender-balanced participation may enhance the success of such interventions. Incorporating women in game-based learning has the potential to support long-term improvements in resource management, highlighting the importance of inclusive approaches.

Water Management | Social Dilemma | Experiential Learning | Games | India

Economic games are emerging as cost-effective and scalable tools for experiential learning in sustainable natural resource management (1, 2). By immersing participants in interactive decision-making scenarios, these games facilitate knowledge acquisition through experience (3, 4). However, evidence on their long-term impact on real-world behavior remains limited (3, 5, 6).

To address this gap, we conducted economic games with dam users in 56 randomly selected villages in Madhya Pradesh, India. Despite the critical role of these dams in irrigation and domestic water supply, maintenance remains inconsistent, and water use lacks coordination. Communities that participated in the games showed significantly greater dam maintenance efforts two years later compared to 28 control communities (6).

This study specifically investigates the role of women's participation and female leadership in shaping water management outcomes. India's government-mandated quotas for women, low-caste community members, and ethnic minorities in village councils have been key to expanding access to public goods, such as drinking water (7, 8). By enabling women to express their preferences, hold leaders accountable, and engage in decision-making, such policies have improved governance (9, 10). We hypothesized that women's involvement in game-based interventions, particularly as primary water users, would have similar positive effects on dam governance and maintenance. By navigating social dilemmas within the game and exploring solutions, women may be empowered to advocate for better water management in real life.

Our intervention is based on Janssen et al.'s irrigation game (11), which simulates key challenges in water management. Participants decide how much of their endowment to invest in dam maintenance and which crops to plant, influencing water availability and distribution. The game was followed by a guided group discussion to reflect on experiences and strategies. Each community's participant composition varied, including an average of 0.4 female leaders, 3.4 non-leader women, 1.2 male leaders, and 9 non-leader men. Communities were categorized into four groups based on leadership composition: no leaders ($n = 9$), only male leaders ($n = 27$), only female leaders ($n = 12$), and mixed-gender leadership ($n = 8$). To assess long-term impact, surveys were conducted with key community informants two months before and two years after the games. These surveys measured the presence of dam management rules and whether the dam had been maintained in the past 12 months.

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Results. Figure 1, Panel A shows that the intervention significantly increased dam maintenance by 20%-points ($\beta = 20.78$, $p = 0.03$, 95% CI= 1.00, 40.57) but not rules for dam maintenance ($\beta = 5.17$, $p = 0.60$, 95% CI= -14.34, 24.67) compared to control communities.


To explore factors associated with these outcomes, we now focus on intervention communities to analyze the relationship between leader participation, gender composition, and water management outcomes using a structural equation model (SEM). As leadership participation and gender composition were not randomly assigned, community-specific characteristics could influence both women's participation in the learning games and collective action for dam maintenance. To mitigate such concerns, we include the presence of self-help groups, schools, and NGO activity as proxies for villages with stronger institutional support for gender inclusion, as these factors are often linked to women's empowerment. Additionally, these characteristics may directly influence water management outcomes (see Materials and Methods for details).

Communities differed in which types of leaders participated in the games, and we categorized them accordingly: no leaders, only male leaders, only female leaders, or mixed-gender leadership. In our analysis, we compare each group to villages without leaders. Communities with only male leaders did not show significant differences in women's participation, rule creation, or dam maintenance relative to non-leader communities (see Supplementary Dataset S5) and are therefore not included in the figures or main discussion. This lack of difference suggests that leadership presence alone is not sufficient to explain the observed improvements in outcomes. The effects seen in female-only and mixed-gender leader communities are therefore more plausibly related to the gender composition of leadership rather than to leader participation per se.

The first pathway indicates the effect for communities where only female leaders participated in our games (Figure 1, Panel B). In such situations, significantly more non-leader women joined the learning sessions compared to villages without leaders ($\beta = 20.72$, $p = 0.01$, 95% confidence interval (CI)= 4.76, 36.69). A higher number of non-leader women in the games was associated with increased creation of dam maintenance rules ($\beta = 14.44$, $p < 0.01$, 95% CI= 8.68, 20.19), a crucial prerequisite for actual dam maintenance ($\beta = 35.86$, $p < 0.01$, 95% CI= 13.81, 57.91). Consequently, greater female participation is indirectly associated with improved dam maintenance ($\beta = 5.18$, $p < 0.01$, 95% CI= 1.39, 8.97). Notably, the presence of only female leaders was not significantly associated with measured village characteristics, suggesting that improvements in water management are more likely linked to the gender composition of the sessions rather than solely to preexisting village differences.

The second pathway examines how inclusive leadership participation influences water management outcomes. In villages with greater institutional support for gender inclusion — characterized by a higher number of female self-help groups, educational facilities, and NGO activities — mixed-gender leadership participation in the learning games was more likely (Figure 2, Panel B). The presence of both male and female leaders improved dam maintenance compared to villages without leaders ($\beta = 43.06$, $p = 0.10$, 95% CI= -0.91, 95.20), suggesting direct benefits of mixed-gender

A Causal effect of experimental learning games intervention



B Intervention villages: Factors associated with outcomes




Fig. 1. The impact of women's participation in games on sustainable water management. Panel A shows the main intervention effect on dam maintenance (yes/no) and related rules (yes/no) with 90 and 95% confidence intervals using a Probit regression. The estimations control for baseline level of the outcome variable, dam purpose, village size, NGO presence, number of SHGs, literacy rate, tribal caste share, number of public schools. We lose two observations due to missing values in these control variables. Panel B visualizes the pathway for villages with only female leader(s) present, while Panel B visualizes the pathway for villages with both male and female leaders participating. All effects are relative to villages where no leaders participated. Estimates are from a structural equation model with robust standard errors. See Supplementary Information (SI) Dataset S8 for the intervention effect estimates and Dataset S5 for all SEM estimates.

leadership participation in the learning sessions for water management. While mixed-gender leadership is directly associated with improvements in dam maintenance, it does not significantly increase women's participation in the games ($\beta = 10.69$, $p = 0.22$, 95% CI= -6.38, 27.76). By contrast, the presence of only female leaders strongly increased women's participation, which is linked to greater rule creation and, ultimately, better water management outcomes.

Discussion. Over the past decades in India, government policies, civil society efforts, and international aid organizations have invested heavily in women's empowerment through self-help groups (12) and binding quotas (13).

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249 Women are often better organized than men (14) and play
 250 a crucial role in local governance. Our findings highlight
 251 that leadership composition influences the effectiveness of
 252 experiential learning interventions. Both female-only and
 253 mixed-gender leadership structures produced the best out-
 254 comes, reinforcing prior research on the role of leadership
 255 in self-governance (15), diversity (16), and collective action.
 256 Women's participation may enhance pro-social values and
 257 introduce diverse perspectives (15), aligning with studies
 258 on the effectiveness of gender quotas in natural resource
 259 management (17).

260 These outcomes are potentially driven by mechanisms
 261 through which the games translated into broader community
 262 engagement and institutional change. In nearly half of
 263 the intervention villages (46%), the games were formally
 264 discussed in community or village council meetings—forums
 265 where new rules are often introduced or reinforced (6). Such
 266 discussions suggest that the experiential format not only
 267 engaged participants during the sessions but also triggered
 268 wider deliberation within local governance structures. While
 269 these conversations were not significantly more common in
 270 villages with female leaders, their overall prevalence supports
 271 the interpretation that the intervention helped initiate rule-
 272 making processes beyond the individual level. Supplementary
 273 Dataset S10 shows that while in-game behavior did not differ
 274 systematically by leadership type, higher non-leader female
 275 participation was associated with more positive player expe-
 276 riences and a greater likelihood that the game was discussed
 277 in formal village meetings, underscoring how broader gender
 278 inclusion may foster community-level deliberation

279 A back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit analysis suggests that
 280 implementing the intervention in one community costs
 281 approximately USD \$75 and increased the likelihood of
 282 proper dam maintenance by 20%-points (see Figure 1, panel
 283 A). While the precise economic impact of this improvement
 284 requires further study, available regional estimates provide
 285 context for potential benefits. According to NGO Action
 286 for Social Advancement (18), fully functional dams in
 287 the region were estimated to generate on average about
 288 \$1,965 in annual agricultural and fishing income compared
 289 to \$689 for a partially functional dam (adjusted to 2022
 290 prices). These estimates suggest that deterioration from
 291 full to partial functionality could represent potential annual
 292 losses of \$826-1,516 per dam. Our model suggests that
 293 communities achieving balanced gender representation in
 294 the learning sessions may experience greater maintenance
 295 improvements. Based on these associations and the regional
 296 value estimates, the economic benefits could potentially
 297 exceed the intervention cost within the first year (see SI
 298 Dataset S1 for calculation assumptions and limitations).
 299 These estimates should be interpreted cautiously, yet the
 300 intervention's low implementation cost and ease of delivery
 301 have facilitated its integration into NGO and government
 302 programs, reaching more than 4,800 communities across India
 303 by 2023.

304 Despite these encouraging results, we caution against
 305 overinterpreting the point estimates from this study, which
 306 involved a relatively small number of villages and observa-
 307 tional variation in leadership composition. The actual effects
 308 of the games and the roles that gender composition and
 309 leader participation play may be smaller when implemented at

311 scale. Our design reflects how such interventions are typically
 312 implemented in practice: through locally appropriate recruit-
 313 ment channels which capture the interplay of leadership,
 314 social networks, and local norms. Although this approach
 315 limits our ability to isolate the causal impact of individual
 316 components (such as the games, debriefing sessions, or specific
 317 types of participants), it offers valuable insight into how
 318 such interventions function under real-world conditions. Our
 319 comparison with census data shows that participants were
 320 generally younger and more literate than the district average,
 321 which was intended to positively influence receptivity to the
 322 intervention. Nonetheless, even modest increases in impacts
 323 due to higher female participation could be meaningful given
 324 the cost-effectiveness and flexibility with which such games
 325 can be integrated into existing programs.

326 Future studies should build on these findings by testing the
 327 potential of games for experiential learning in larger samples
 328 and diverse contexts, and by experimentally varying key
 329 components—such as the gender composition of participants,
 330 the involvement of community leaders, and recruitment
 331 methods—to better identify the mechanisms driving changes
 332 in resource governance. Most likely, the observed effects
 333 reflect the interaction of multiple factors rather than a
 334 single cause. Comparing game-based interventions to active
 335 controls, such as standard information workshops, would help
 336 determine whether the experiential elements provide added
 337 value over more conventional approaches.

338 Our study provides evidence that experiential learning
 339 games can be a valuable complement to empowerment and
 340 natural resource management programs. While the observed
 341 improvements in water management may be influenced by
 342 multiple factors, our results suggest that female participation
 343 in these sessions plays an important role. These findings
 344 underscore the value of integrating women into such interven-
 345 tions—not only as a matter of equity but also as a potential
 346 driver of more effective and sustainable resource management.

347 Materials and Methods

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 350 **Study implementation.** Based on a 2011 census village list, 56
 351 study and 28 control communities were randomly selected. In
 352 intervention communities, we implemented the experiential learn-
 353 ing intervention between baseline and follow-up surveys, while
 354 control communities received no intervention (Figure 2). Local
 355 leaders and local experts were interviewed about villages' water
 356 management and governance practices. These surveys provide our
 357 two main outcomes, which we use to measure behavioral change:
 358 (i) maintenance of the village dam in the last year and (ii) the
 359 existence of dam management rules. An overview of village-level
 360 survey measures collected at baseline and follow-up is available in
 361 SI Dataset S4.

362 The learning sessions were conducted between March and June
 363 2017 by Marburg University in collaboration with researchers
 364 from the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid
 365 Tropics (ICRISAT) and the Foundation for Ecological Security
 366 (FES, India). Although FES was involved in the broader research
 367 collaboration, the project was presented to participants as academic
 368 research with no relation to FES. A week prior to each session, a
 369 field facilitator met with a village council (panchayat) member to
 370 introduce the study and request the participation of 14 community
 371 members who were either direct users of the village dam or
 372 involved in local natural resource governance. Recruitment followed
 373 standard practices for community mobilization in the region and
 374 included an explicit request to ensure the participation of women,
 375 which was typically facilitated through female panchayat members.
 376 Leaders were defined as individuals holding formal or semi-formal




Fig. 2. Overview of data sources used. The SI gives additional information on the participants in the games as well as an overview of the measurement of all outcome variables.

positions in village governance or natural resource management. This included elected panchayat members ($n=36$), individuals involved in community-based natural resource management (CB-NRM) bodies ($n=43$), and leaders of self-help groups (SHGs, $n=7$). Three leaders also held informal leadership roles within cultural or community groups. The composition of leaders across these categories, and by gender, is detailed in the SI Dataset S9.

On the day of the learning session, the lead facilitator first provided information about the project, the project partners, and the game, and introduced the facilitation team. S/he then explained the type of data to be collected, and the way the data would be stored and used. Expectations regarding the project outcomes were clarified. The facilitator informed the players again about the time required to run a session. After all these explanations, oral consent was obtained and a short survey was conducted before the learning session began. On average, participants were 33 years old, female participation was about 25%, about half had only primary education, and less than 5% were illiterate. Summary statistics for these characteristics are provided in SI Dataset S2.

Statistical analyses. We used a SEM to assess both direct and indirect pathways through which female leadership and partici-

pation impacted water management outcomes. SEM's ability to model latent variables and test complex causal pathways makes it well-suited for disentangling the interplay between gendered participation, leadership, and institutional outcomes. All SEM analyses were conducted using STATA software with the 'sem' and 'gsem' commands.

To account for non-randomized leadership participation, we control for village characteristics such as the number of female self-help groups, school presence, NGO activity, literacy rate, and share of tribal caste members. These factors not only indicate institutional support for gender inclusion but may also directly influence water management outcomes. To address potential biases from preexisting differences between villages, we control for baseline levels of dam maintenance and management rules, ensuring observed effects are not confounded by initial conditions.

Over time, the facilitation team improved in encouraging women to participate in the games. In the first 28 communities, an average of 2.5 women joined each learning session, while in the second half, this increased to 4.3 women (T-Test diff. = -1.8 , $p < 0.01$). While balancing tests detected no structural differences between early and late villages (SI Dataset S3), limited statistical power due to sample size may obscure subtle variations. Controlling for session order and baseline outcomes further reduces temporal confounding. Robustness checks using generalized SEM (SI Dataset S6) and excluding baseline dam rules (SI Dataset S7) confirmed consistency across model specifications.

Ethics. The study received ethics approval from the School of Business and Economics of the University of Marburg.

Data availability. The data and analysis scripts are available on Zenodo (<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8009659>).

Supporting Information (SI). The SI file provides extended methods and supporting datasets S1 to S10.

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